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Within the literature on Japan’s approach to nuclear 
weapons there are two prominent themes. The first is 
the debate on how likely Japan is to build a weapon. 
The second focuses on the apparent contradiction 
between Tokyo’s desire for a world without nuclear 
weapons and its reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. 
This paper focuses on the years 2012-2018 and 
argues that regarding the first question Japan remains 
unlikely as ever to go nuclear. In terms of the second 
issue, 2012-2018 witnessed the increasing tension 
in Japan’s ‘dual track’ (Kase 2001: 55) approach of 
nuclear approval and denial, with Japan favouring 
deepening of the US alliance to the expense of its 
disarmament diplomacy.
The years 2012-2018 were chosen because 2012 saw 
the return of the LDP under Abe and the start of a 
period of relative domestic stability compared to the 
previous six Prime Ministers in six years. Abe is also 
regarded as having a distinctly militaristic approach 
to Japan’s security policy, which may have an impact 
on Japan’s nuclear thinking. The election of Trump in 
the USA and the effect of his approach to the Japan-
US alliance is worth considering. Finally, this period 
also saw the humanitarian-driven global disarma-
ment movement which culminated in the 2017 
Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (NWPT), and 
Japan’s continued rejection of this in 2018 serves as a 
convenient end point for the analysis. First, the paper 
will outline the two themes in the literature and their 
development up to 2012, before outlining how events 
2012-2018 affected them in the second part.
The ‘Will Japan Go Nuclear?’ Debate
The idea that Japan could go nuclear has its basis in 
the works of realist IR thinkers (Hymans 2006: 155). 
According to realist logic, Japan has motivation to 
build a nuclear weapons programme because it faces 
threats from nuclear armed rivals in China, North 
Korea, and Russia. It cannot depend long term on 
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the nonproliferation regime nor protection from the 
USA, due to self-interest of states (ibid: 156). The 
‘latent’ ability Japan has from its developed nuclear 
power industry (Hughes 2007: 80; Fitzpatrick 2015: 
82) could be seen as support for this analysis.
However, the fact that realist predictions clearly 
overstated the likelihood of global proliferation has 
meant alternative explanations have become more 
prominent (Hymans 2006: 456-459). There is now 
a greater recognition that countries’ thinking on 
nuclear weapons must take into account the domestic 
prism the leadership view them through (Hymans 
2011: 154). Accordingly, many writers have focused 
on the Japanese domestic political taboo and national 
‘nuclear allergy’ as constraints on a weapons 
programme (Rublee 2010: 57). Political, financial, 
and reputational costs (Kase 2001: 65; Hughes 2007), 
Japan’s geographic and demographic weaknesses 
under a MAD type arrangement (Hughes 2007: 78), 
and domestic bureaucratic ‘veto players’ (Hymans 
2011) also represent significant disincentives and 
constraints.
The post cold war period brought prominent poli-
tician’s statements suggesting weakening of the 
domestic political taboo, and ‘nuclear allergy’ 
(Mochizuki 2007: 303), the increased threat from 
the DPRK, undermining of the Non Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) by India, Pakistan and North Korea, 
and increased concerns over the credibility of the 
Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) (Roehrig 2017: 
9-10) from the US. As a result, writers began to 
reassess the prospects of Japan building a weapon 
(Mochizuki 2007; Hughes 2007).
The consensus was that it was very unlikely for the 
foreseeable future (Hughes 2007: 68), due to the 
factors mentioned above. Particularly relevant were 
the evaluations of the 1968/70 Internal Report and 
the 1995 JDA Report. Both reports were made in 
similar, if not more severe security environments to 
Japan faced in the 2000s. The 1968/1970 was written 
in the context of the 1964 Chinese test, NPT coming 
into force and US negotiations over the reversion of 
Okinawa (Kase 2001: 56) and 1995 after the North 
Korean 1993 missile test and subsequent crisis, and 
Japanese concerns about the indefinite extension of 
the NPT (Hughes 2007: 77). Neither the 1968/70 nor 
1995 report believed that a nuclear weapon would 
be in Japan’s interest. Importantly, the 1995 report 
also considered a “worst-case scenario” in which 
neighbouring countries seek a nuclear capability 
and neither the US END nor NPT longer existed 
and concluded the geographical and population 
constraints meant a nuclear weapon programme 
would still be unadvisable (Hughes 2007: 78-9). In 
addition, in Kurosawa’s survey of the Japanese elite 
positions on the main nuclear questions, the vast 
majority of those who did believe Japan should build 
a nuclear weapon assumed this would be done with 
the support or permission of the US, and the vast 
majority of opinions on the issue in general believed 
it was “unthinkable that the US would allow a nuclear 
Japan” (2006: 132). Continued support of the nuclear 
umbrella was seen as a far better alternative (Mochizuki 
2007: 304) to the new uncertainties surrounding 
Japanese security in the second nuclear age.
The conclusion that Japan would not build a bomb 
was borne out in events leading up to 2012. In the 
aftermath of the 2006 North Korean test, analysts 
saw no move towards a weapon (Schoff 2009: viii; 
Shankar and Onishi 2006) and commented on the 
‘restrained’ (Howe and Campbell 2013: 101; Izumi 
and Furukawa 2007) nature of Japan’s response. The 
2011 Fukushima nuclear reactor accident reignited 
the public revulsion for ‘all things nuclear’ (Samuels 
and Schoff 2015: 491) and increased the number of 
veto players in the industry (Windram 2014). In addi-
tion, the 2006-2012 governments were too unstable 
to bring about many major policy changes, with six 
prime ministers in six years, the end of 50 year rule 
of the LDP and a brief ideologically different, but 
ineffective rule from the DPJ.
2012-2018 though, saw the return of a pro-military, 
pro-nuclear power Abe with large majorities, intent 
on security reform. In 2016, the US elected Trump, 
who had made several comments suggesting he 
valued alliances less than previous presidents and 
may be favourable to a Japanese nuclear bomb. This 
paper argues, however, that this remained as unlikely 
as ever, and that the period saw ever greater Japanese 
interest in the nuclear umbrella as the superior policy 
choice.
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Japan’s Dilemma: A World Without 
Nuclear Weapons versus Reliance on 
the Nuclear Umbrella
Japan is regarded as being a leading proponent of 
global disarmament and makes considerable inter-
national efforts to this end (Rublee 2010: 57-9). 
However, to many observers, this is undercut by the 
continued support of the US END. One example of 
this was when Japanese criticism of India’s 1998 test 
was dismissed by India on the basis of Japan relying 
on the nuclear umbrella (Kurosawa 2006: 140). 
Japan’s ability to maintain this dual track approach 
became under strain in the 2000s. On the one hand 
the LDP under Prime Minister Fukuda jointly estab-
lished the International Commission on Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament (ICNND) 
with Australia, which had a specific focus on the 
responsibilities of US allies for a nuclear free world 
and recommended support for NFU (Evans and 
Kawaguchi 2009: xx). In part inf luenced by this 
document, the left-leaning DPJ under Hatoyama 
attempted to “tilt the balance between the two 
policy goals of nuclear disarmament and deterrence 
further in favor of the former” (Satoh 2009). On the 
other hand, the decay of the 1955 system had been 
accompanied by a growing interest in the workings 
of nuclear deterrence and steps to move from being a 
passive recipient of the nuclear umbrella to an active 
partner (Satoh 2009: 25; Satoh 2014; Roehrig 2017:
35) through initiatives like the Extended Deterrence 
Dialogue (EDD). The strong desire to maintain the 
nuclear umbrella in its full form was occasionally at 
the expense of disarmament measures, for example 
the Japanese officials opposition to US Non First Use 
(NFU) (Satoh 2009: 27; Cossa and Glosserman 2011: 
132) and pressurising the US not to reduce the role 
of nuclear weapons in their 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) (Fruhling and O’Neill 2017: 17) and to 
keep the TLAM/N as a “crucial symbol of US cred-
ibility” (Roehrig 2017: 110-1). Despite the significant 
credibility concerns surrounding END, it appeared 
that it remained vital to the Japanese leadership, both 
for its security guarantee against North Korea and 
China and for the political symbolism of the overall 
health of the alliance (Roehrig 2017: 9-10).
2012-2018 was to see the humanitarian-driven disar-
mament movement resulting in the 2017 Nuclear 
Weapons Prohibition Treaty, which was on one hand 
an opportunity for Japan’s disarmament diplomacy, 
but on the other, intensified the dilemma, due to the 
US opposition to the treaty. This paper argues that in 
this period Japan favoured strengthening the END 
at the expense of its disarmament diplomacy, and 
contrary to the global disarmament cause. 
2012-2018: Security Reforms, Trump, 
NWPT
1. The Return of Abe and Security Reforms
Abe’s second term is regarded as pursuing security-
oriented realist thinking, often to much opposition 
from the pacifist attitude in the general public (Auslin 
2016: 125), in what is known as ‘the Abe Doctrine’ 
-that Japan’s military should be expanded into an 
international role to better defend the country’s 
national interest (Envall 2018: 2). This was in the 
context of the domestic change from away from the 
1955 system, with particular emphasis on central-
ising security decision making power in the Prime 
Minister’s office.
From 2012, Abe’s government pushed through 
several institutional, legal, diplomatic, and mili-
tary reforms (Auslin 2016: 125) Some particularly 
important changes to Japan’s approach to security 
under Abe were firstly the creation of a National 
Security Council in 2013 as a centrally controlled 
body to manage security crises. Secondly, Abe 
increased spending on the military from 4.71 trillion 
yen in 2012 to 5.17 trillion in 2017 (Envall 2018: 12). 
While this was arguably still rather modest, it was 
an increase which contrasted with previous years’ 
stagnation (Auslin 2016: 130). Third was the contro-
versial law to allow Japan’s military to act overseas, 
a reversal of a 70 year pacifist stance (ibid: 125). 
The reforms should not be seen as signs of Japan 
turning to a greater conventional military capa-
bility to compensate for less focus on the nuclear 
umbrella’s ability to ensure Japan’s security. In fact, 
it can be argued that the 2013 NDPG released under 
Abe placed the nuclear umbrella in greater impor-
tance than previous documents, (Roehrig 2017: 102), 
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with stronger language describing “extended deter-
rence provided by the US with nuclear deterrence at 
its core (as) indispensable” and declared that Japan 
would support this through close co-operation with 
the US and measures of its own, such as Ballistic 
Missile Defence (Japan Ministry of Defense 2013: 6). 
Japan - US dialogue continued in the EDD talks and 
the US let Japanese officials visit aspects of specific 
weapons systems to enhance credibility (Roehrig 
2017: 109), such as the control centre for an ICBM in 
Montana in 2013 and the Sandia laboratories in 2014. 
Much of the focus has been enabling Japan to coop-
erate with its allies, such as the 2014 Diet approval of 
changing the type of arms Japan is able to export to 
the US to enable coordination on defence technology 
(Auslin 2016: 130). Moves towards greater collective 
defence ability would also enable work on the nuclear 
umbrella with South Korea. Thus, while significant 
security changes were made under Abe, they repre-
sented continuation of a growing role as a partner 
with the US in extended deterrence, with supporting 
the nuclear umbrella an important aspect of this. 
2. The Trump Shock
The election of Trump in the US initially brought 
with it fear that Japan would not be able to continue 
the arrangement it had with the US. He made refer-
ences to wanting to renegotiate terms with allies 
so that they were more favourable to the US and 
claimed to be prepared to walk away if this did not 
happen (Jackson 2017: 35). It thus seemed that under 
Trump, ‘America-first’ thinking would be dominant, 
with the nuclear umbrella regarded as a private good 
the US could choose to provide, based on the lead-
ership’s perceived short term interests. This also 
suggested an end to the trend of increasing partner-
ship over the nuclear umbrella since the advent of the 
EDD talks. Trump had also reignited speculation that 
Japan could go nuclear. Specifically, he had made 
suggestions during the election campaign that Japan 
should build its own nuclear weapons and that the 
US could abandon its allies if they were attacked by 
North Korea (Finnegan 2016). As earlier suggested 
in this paper, the US appearing to accept a Japanese 
nuclear weapon would remove one of the strongest 
reasons for not developing one in the eyes of the 
Japanese elite. The result for some observers was that 
there was “more than enough reason to begin seeking 
alternative ways to ensure Japanese security” 
(Hikotani 2017: 21). 
This section, however, argues that Japan was not 
motivated to move away from reliance on the nuclear 
umbrella towards a nuclear weapons programme by 
the election of Trump. The argument will be demon-
strated by first explaining that the extent to which 
Trump’s campaign rhetoric might have motivated 
change by Japan to its nuclear thinking ought not to 
be overstated. He arguably had neither the intent or 
capability to change the US’s long term commitment 
to deterring attacks on Japan and the Japanese did 
not take his rhetoric as indicating such. Second, in 
practice, the Trump administration showed commit-
ment to Japan and the nuclear umbrella once in 
office. Third, this section will outline the main expla-
nations in the literature for this continuation. Fourth 
will be the caveat that Trump’s approach does not 
make it easy for Japan to ally itself with the US on 
nuclear issues.
From the outset, Trump’s campaign rhetoric was 
likely to have limited effect on Japanese opinion.
Trump himself quickly rejected the claim he had 
suggested Japan should develop a nuclear weapon 
(LoBianco 2016) and his thoughts were further ‘clar-
ified’ by a campaign adviser, who stated that Trump 
would “not ask Japan or South Korea to invest in 
building nuclear weapons” (as cited in Carroll 2016). 
In general, while much has been made of contro-
versial statements by Trump in many countries, it is 
doubtful that the Japanese public attached the same 
level of importance to them (Hikotani 2017: 24). At 
the level of officials, several aides to the President 
were reported to have advised the Japanese not to 
put too much meaning into the appearance of radical 
change to policy Trump’s public rhetoric (Brunnstrom 
2016). In fact Michaels and Williams demonstrate 
that the substance of Trump’s statements on nuclear 
weapons has been reasonably consistent with 
previous Republican Presidents when viewed over 
the past few decades (2017: 54).
Regarding Trump’s attitude towards the END, it is 
doubtful that he actually saw it as easily disposable. 
As discussed earlier, the US had a long-standing 
view that preventing Japan from developing a nuclear 
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weapon was a priority. In order, to actually enact a 
policy change away from this, Trump would have 
needed to make foreign policy a bigger priority 
and spend political capital on it rather than other 
concerns such as health care or the Mexican border 
wall, in the face of likely bipartisan opposition (Lind 
2018: 243).
It is more convincing Trump’s statements during this 
period should be seen as part of his perspective on 
positioning in negotiating strategy. For instance Lind 
(2018: 244) argues that a trend in interaction between 
the US and Japan was that Trump wanted to pay 
more for its defence but Japan was reluctant to do so 
and concludes that “(u)nder Trump, the two countries 
have thus settled into their longstanding pattern since 
World War II, in which Washington seeks, and Tokyo 
accepts, minimal and gradual increases in Japan’s 
capabilities and roles”. It is more than possible that 
Trump viewed negotiations in this way. For instance, 
another key takeaway from Michaels and Williams’ 
survey on Trump’s long-term rhetoric was a strong 
linguistic theme of being someone with belief in the 
merits of uncompromising negotiating stances. At 
least part of his combative language towards allies 
could be explained by a desire to present an identity 
as a tough talking ‘dealmaker’ (2017: 71). 
In addition to this point about the theme of posi-
tioning and bargaining running through Trump’s 
interaction with Japan, in much of the literature on 
Trump's effect on alliances, it was recognised that 
“Trump the President will be under very different 
public, political, and personal constraints than Trump 
the candidate” (Michaels and Williams 2017: 56). In 
fact, following on from this, much of the actual rhet-
oric from the Trump administration once in power 
was supportive of maintaining the status quo with 
Japan. In contrast to pre-election demands that Japan 
contribute more to the alliance or face abandonment, 
US Defence Secretary Matthis called the alliance 
with Japan ‘a model of cost-sharing’ in a 2017 visit 
which was well received by Japan (Lind 2018: 242). 
The meeting between Abe and Trump soon after 
that was regarded as particularly positive (Jibiki and 
Moriyasu 2017), with the reaction to a sudden North 
Korean nuclear test being a statement by Trump that 
the US stood “100%” behind Japan (ibid). Similarly, 
a Joint Statement proclaimed that “(t)he US commit-
ment to defend Japan through the full range of US 
military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, 
is unwavering” (Joint Statement 2017). Japan was 
also pleased to receive written confirmation that the 
Senkaku islands were protected under the security 
treaty. 
Overall, rather than Trump causing radical depar-
ture from Japan's approach to nuclear weapons, the 
transition represented more continuity than change 
in the US attitude to the nuclear umbrella. From 
Japan’s side, Abe clearly prioritised maintaining the 
credibility of the US promise to defend Japan. In 
particular, the effort Japan put into managing Trump 
in order to maintain the alliance is commented upon 
(Jibiki and Moriyasu 2017; Hikotani 2017: 22-3), 
with Hikotani describing the particular strategy as 
being one of careful disarming and disengaging 
Trump from policies which could damage the nuclear 
umbrella’s credibility (2017: 22-23). 
From Japan’s point of view, in terms of turning 
towards creating a nuclear weapon, it might have 
been possible that a minority within Japan would 
speak out in favour of such a policy, but as with 
earlier in the decade, this would not have been 
advantageous for Japan (The Trump Administration 
2017: 3) and there is no reason to believe this was 
not still a well accepted view within the Abe govern-
ment. This logic stands even if the government had 
interpreted the Trump administration’s behaviour as 
being both enough of a damage to END’s credibility 
and enough of an approval of a Japanese weapon 
programme to outweigh its other political and 
financial costs and constraints. As discussed in the 
previous section, there are many problems with the 
idea that Japan could easily change its latent status to 
possession of an actual weapon. ‘Nuclear breakout’ 
would not be easily achieved in a short period, and 
Japanese proliferation would far more likely to be in 
“slow motion” (Holmes and Yoshihara 2012: 129), 
meaning it prudent to wait for a change in regime in 
the US, rather than explore the financially and politi-
cally costly alternative of a nuclear programme (Knopf 
2017: 31). Careful diplomacy playing up to the latent 
capability would be a satisfactory alternative and 
not a departure from previous strategy. Overall, it 
makes sense to conclude that Trump’s election made 
little difference to the Japanese approach to nuclear 
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weapons 2016-2018.
This, however, is not to say that 2016-2018 was 
worry-free for Japan regarding Trump and nuclear 
weapons. Japan’s concerns about the two North 
Korean issues of abductions (Mori and Nobuhiro 
2018) and lack of success in multilateral approaches 
to nonproliferation appeared to be bypassed by 
Trump’s bilateral meetings with Kim. In a longer 
term sense regarding nonproliferation, Trump’s use 
of media often meant sending confusing nuclear 
signalling to allies and adversaries (Michaels and 
Williams 2017: 67). In addition, the removal of the 
JCPOA in Iran raised the possibility of proliferation 
in the Middle East (Knopf 2017: 32), which would be 
a blow to the international regime, a further concern 
for Japan. All this has been leading to calls for Japan 
to take a lead in the maintenance of the global liberal 
order due to Trump’s reluctance to do so (Hikotani 
2017: 20). Finally, as will be discussed in the section 
to follow, Trump’s attitude to disarmament was 
much more at odds with the Japanese public than 
the previous administration (Michaels and Williams 
2017: 62). Evidently, there is much potential for the 
Trump administration to cause difficulties for Japan, 
especially in nuclear weapons policy. However, the 
main point in this section is that in 2016-2018 there 
was little reason for or evidence of Japan turning 
away from close co-operation with the US and 
commitment to the nuclear umbrella, or any sign of 
change in attitude to developing a nuclear weapon. 
Initial international concern among allies and benefi-
ciaries of the nuclear umbrella did not translate into 
any consideration of alternative options. Instead, 
most of the government’s energy was spent on 
making sure the credibility of the US commitment 
remained unaffected by Trump’s diplomatic unpre-
dictability.
3.  The Disarmament/END Dilemma: 
NWPT Negotiations
The dilemma reconciling the gap between steps 
towards global nuclear disarmament and support of 
the nuclear umbrella continued to be an issue under 
Abe 2012-2018. One illustrative episode was the 
government’s decision to be the only country to sign 
two similarly worded statements on the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons, one emphasising 
that nuclear weapons must not be used because of 
their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and 
the other recognising that security concerns were 
also important (Akiyama 2015: 444 Fitzpatrick 
2015: 76-7). However, it was the movement to create 
NWPT based on an effort to refocus the disarmament 
movement on a humanitarian argument, rather than 
security (Potter 2017: 75) which suggested that Japan 
could no longer sit uncomfortably on the fence on 
this issue, and in the end as with the NFU NPR issue 
under the DPJ, showed Japan would favour support 
of the END to the expense of disarmament.
There are a great deal of reasons why the NWPT 
would appeal to Japan’s national-psyche driven 
desire to realise its long-term goal of global disarma-
ment. Firstly, one main premise of the treaty was that 
nuclear weapons were fundamentally inhumane (Fihn 
2017: 44) and the disarmament argument should 
focus on rejecting them because of their humani-
tarian consequences (Potter 2017: 75). This fits very 
well with the constructivist interpretation of Japanese 
thinking on nuclear weapons. For example, Rublee 
quotes a senior Japanese nuclear expert in saying:
“the first entry point of any conversation on nuclear 
weapons is Hiroshima and Nagasaki—not the role 
of weapons in terms of security or strategy, but the 
atomic devastation Japan suffered” (2009: 57). In 
addition, the aim of the treaty was to strengthen the 
international norm against nuclear weapons (Fihn 
2017: 47). Again, as Rublee demonstrated, the Japa-
nese leadership is regarded, at least to some extent as 
having absorbed international norms against nuclear 
weapons (2009: 98). From a liberal institutionalist 
perspective, the NWPT offered a seemingly attrac-
tive alternative framework to the NPT (Thakur 
2017: 72), a treaty which Japan and other states are 
not entirely satisfied with. Indeed, as discussed 
earlier, although Japan has been a strong supporter 
of the NPT in contributions, accepting inspections 
and rhetoric, neither its joining nor acceptance of 
indefinite extension in 1995 were straightforward. In 
addition, as mentioned earlier, the potential for Japa-
nese reconsideration of its nuclear policy in the mid 
2000s is at least in part regarded as being caused by 
dissatisfaction with the NPT being unable to prevent 
North Korea becoming a nuclear threat. What is 
more, Japan believes its role in global disarmament 
86
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.61  (September  2020)
diplomacy is important and there was a sense that 
Japan would be key to realisation of this vision and 
could play a leading role. According to Thakur, “Japan 
is the emotional touchstone of nuclear weapons 
policy” (2018b: 12) and the treaty would gain signifi-
cant weight from it switching sides to the side of the 
majority of states, including those in its immediate 
region (Thakur 2018a: 84). In sum, the treaty offered 
the clearest definition yet of how Japan’s pursuit of 
a world without nuclear weapons could manifest in 
a more immediate coherent strategy and there was 
motivation for Japan to pursue it.
Fundamentally, though, the logic of the NWPT 
at tempted to delegit imise nuclear deter rence 
(Thakur 2018b: 13), which was plainly incompatible 
with Japan’s long-standing support of the nuclear 
umbrella, which had been reiterated a number of 
times in the past decade by a variety of governments, 
including the pro-disarmament DPJ. Another impor-
tant premise of the argument behind the NWPT was 
Tannenwald’s nuclear taboo (1999), in particular that 
it was the international non-nuclear norm, rather than 
deterrence which had prevented their use (Thakur 
2018b: 21). Again, Japanese policymakers clearly did 
not agree with this interpretation. In the event, Japan 
declined to take part in the negotiations and justified 
it much along the lines of the argument of all other 
states under the nuclear umbrella. These states all 
stressed that deterrence was necessary due to the 
reality of security conditions, reiterated their belief 
that the “step by step” approach they had outlined 
(A Progressive Approach 2016) was superior and 
believed that the NWPT undermined the NPT, which 
although imperfect, was necessary to prevent prolif-
eration. These were all long held views by the nuclear 
umbrella states and it was therefore unsurprising that 
Japan would reject the treaty at that time and should 
not by itself be seen as a change in policy against a 
global disarmament agenda.
Although Japan’s rejection of the Treaty is compat-
ible with its, and umbrella states’ more generally, 
thinking on nuclear weapons, it is noticeable that 
Japan refused to take part in negotiations when it 
could have done, or make a statement as an observer, 
which would have been permitted by the NWPT 
(Yoshida 2018: 481). This was especially notable as 
the domestic disarmament audience expected more 
(Hiroshima Mayor Questions Nuclear Nations 2018). 
The symbolically important hibakusha for instance 
declared themselves ‘heartbroken’ by Japan’s deci-
sion (Hibakusha ‘Heartbroken’ 2017). In addition, in 
the rejection of the treaty, Abe claimed a future role 
of acting as a bridge between Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS) and Non-NWS (Hurst 2018). However, by 
not participating in the negotiations on a treaty over-
whelmingly supported by the Non-NWS, it is difficult 
to see how Japan could fulfil such a role when taking 
such a strong stance alongside the NWS. For example, 
Thakur argues that “ along with other umbrella 
allies, Japan sits uncomfortably between the NWS 
and non-NWS. This could be turned to advantage 
by acting as an intermediary between the concerns 
of the non-NWS and the policies and practices of 
the NWS” (2018b: 27-8) and explains that examples 
of such would be asking the US and Russia to take 
weapons off high alert and support a NFU stance. 
Strikingly, Japan’s refusal to take part was in contrast 
to the Netherlands, also an umbrella state, which did 
take part in the negotiations (Yoshida 2018: 481). That 
Japan refused to sign the treaty was unsurprising, due 
to the radical rejection of END it would have meant, 
something that no other NWS or umbrella state 
was anywhere near prepared to do. However, it is 
particularly important to note that Japan not only was 
against signing the treaty, but refused to take part 
in the negotiations, something that the Netherlands, 
another umbrella state, was prepared to do.
Evidence suggests that desire to avoid upsetting the 
US under Trump played at least some part in this 
decision. Ota (2017: 206), quotes a senior Japanese 
official of the National Security Secretariat:
(With respect to potential Japanese participa-
tion in the negotiation,) there have been different 
opinions inside the Japanese government. Some 
have argued that it still may be possible for 
Japan to participate in the treaty negotiation. 
But, others said that Japan would be accused of 
deceiving the US by the (Donald) Trump admin-
istration, if Japan decides to participate. If this is 
the case, the Japan-US relationship would be hurt 
in the long run.
The idea that Japan might be seen as deceiving 
the US referred to the statement that Trump had 
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supported the US backing Japan with the nuclear 
umbrella (Ota 2017: 206). It is conceivable that a 
meeting between Tillerson and Kishida, in which the 
US is believed to have told Japan it opposed Japan 
participating in the talks, may have been influential 
in Japan’s decision (Trump administration opposes 
Japan’s participation 2017).
Furthermore, the comparative lack of support for 
Japan’s 2017 annual disarmament resolution was 
reportedly due to the unpopularity of weakening of 
the language from the previous years’ “Reaffirming 
its commitment towards a peaceful and secure world 
free of nuclear weapons” to “Reaffirms, in this 
regard, the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear 
weapon states to fully implement the Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” alongside 
the lack of reference to the NWPT. In particular, 
there was reportedly a feeling among the critical 
NWPT states that Japan had changed the wording 
due to pressure from the US (Japan criticized 2017).
Japan’s refusal to take part in the negotiations thus 
did indicate that when steps towards a world without 
nuclear weapons could possibly be taken in accor-
dance with its stated intention-to act as a bridge 
between NWS and Non-NWS-but would upset the 
US under Trump, Japan would avoid taking them. 
While Abe giving into Trump was a reversal of the 
previous occasions where the US under Obama had 
been pressured by a nervous Japan not to reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons, it similarly demonstrated 
recognition by Japan of the politically symbolic 
importance of the nuclear umbrella. 
As a result, 2018 ended with a growing feeling 
among some observers, that Japan’s stated intent 
to be supportive of global disarmament measures 
no longer carried much meaning and that it was a 
distinct second priority to the US END (Thakur 
2018b: 24; Japan’s weakened UN draft 2017). For 
instance, former DPJ Foreign Minister Okada 
reflected in a 2018 interview:
Looking back, I wonder what Japan has been 
doing to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. 
Not too many activities occur to my mind. It is 
true that Japan has broadcast its message as the 
only nation that has suffered the aftermath of 
atomic bombings, but the country has committed 
almost nothing towards the creation of a world 
without nuclear weapons... I estimate that Japan is 
not very trusted as a champion of nuclear disar-
mament because of its obsession with the US–
Japan alliance or the nuclear umbrella (Yoshida 
2018: 481-484).
Conclusion
In contrast to the idealist thinking of the DPJ under 
Hatoyama and the Obama drive for a world without 
nuclear weapons between 2009-2012, the post 
2012 period of nuclear thinking was dominated by 
the two hard-headed nationalists Abe and Trump. 
Nonetheless, the basic direction of Japanese nuclear 
thinking remained the same. Except for some slight 
concern over the US commitment to the umbrella at 
the beginning of Trump’s Presidency, there was no 
incentive in this period for Japan to consider thinking 
about how to negotiate the practically insurmount-
able obstacles to a nuclear weapon. The US umbrella 
clearly remained attractive to Japan, with Abe 
risking significant public backlash to improve Japan’s 
military’s ability to cooperate with the US, at least in 
part in order to supplement the END. In addition, the 
lack of interest in the NWPT negotiations suggested 
the political symbolism of the nuclear umbrella was 
becoming a more influential factor than the desire 
for global nuclear disarmament in Japan’s peren-
nial deterrence-disarmament dilemma, at least with 
Trump in the White House.
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